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Paternity and the Quasi-Marital Child
The Honorable Diana Tennis*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to imagine the depth of feelings aroused by some
routine litigation. When that litigation centers on children and the
adults who love them intensely, the result is often an emotional,
chaotic and sometimes toxic courtroom mix. Given how much
longer it takes to complete the appellate review process, one
cannot help but think about the pain and turmoil the children (and
adults) suffered while some of the herein cited cases made their
way through our court system.
When reading the cases themselves, consider that the
litigation likely took one to two years at the trial level, and often at
least that much time working its way up through one or more
levels of appeal. In some cases, the children have gone from being
toddlers to middle-schoolers by the time the courts determine their
lifelong legal parents. Sometimes the legal result is that the
children no longer keep the parents they have loved since birth. To
say that the legal system is not equipped to deal with the emotional
quagmire it creates in family cases is a drastic understatement.
Pointing out the structural problems inherent in utilizing a slow,
logic driven, paid-by-the-hour legal system to determine the family
dynamics for children is not the purpose of this article. However,
the author hopes that with every new generation of legal
professionals we will come closer to recognizing the harm being
done to our families and develop better practices and principles to
help families reorganize legally, and do so in an ever more childcentered and emotionally healthy way.

*

Circuit Court Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Family Division, Orlando, Florida.
Special recognition for editing, drafting and education on all things grammar
belongs to Lisa Harris, JD and Attorney at Law, Orlando, Florida.
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II. QUASI- MARITAL CHILDREN AND THE
PARENTS WHO LOVE THEM
Historically, fathers looking to establish their legal rights over
children have had a hard row to hoe, at least as compared to their
female counterparts. At common law and under early “bastardy”
laws, biological fathers had no parental rights over children born
out of marriage. The first paternity statutes were created as tools
for mothers to obtain financial support,1 and for a long time, men
could not use these tools. Under the initial “Bastardy Act” of 1828,
only unmarried women could sue for paternity and child support.
Relevant to our discussion herein, this changed significantly in
1976, when the Florida Supreme Court found under equal
protection grounds that a woman married to another man (who was
not the biological father of the child) was permitted to sue the
biological father for child support.2 In 1980, the right to sue for
paternity was finally extended to the biological fathers
themselves.3
Fast forward to 2019. The “family” landscape has
mushroomed exponentially in variety and diversity. We are now in
the bold new age of complex merging families, men and women
waiting longer to marry and have children, fading stigma regarding
unwed births, and exploding technology in the baby-making sector.
The result is an ever-expanding category of “quasi-marital”
children. While traditionally defined as “a child born when the
mother is married to a man other than the biological father,”4 it can
now be said that there are a multitude of potential categories of
“quasi- marital” children.5
Herein we will discuss the development of the fundamental
rights of parenting and the expansion of fathers (and the author
1

23 FLPRAC Section 5:2.
See Gammon v. Cobb 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976).
3
See Kendrick v. Everheart 390 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1980).
4
See Fernandez v. McKenney 776 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); See also
Fernandez v. Fernandez 857 So.2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Chis W.
Altenbernd’s article Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law’s Failure in
Privette and Daniels Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 Fla. St. U.L.. Rev. (1999)).
5
Nevitt v. Bonoma 53 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Cases involving
‘quasi-marital children’ are particularly complicated because they present major
public policy issues that are difficult, if not impossible, to address with the case
law method.” (quoting Dep’t of Revenue ex. Rel. Preston v. Cummings, 871 So.
2d at 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)).
2
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would argue children’s) rights to lay claim to a legal relationship
between that biological parent and their child. We shall also
endeavor to parse out of the myriad of patterns, those facts that
appear to improve a biological father’s legal chances to establish
paternal rights, and explore what remains to be done to encourage
truly children-centric determinations about parentage.
III. JURISDICTION OVER THE CHILD
No legal discussion about parentage would be complete,
particularly relating to such a transitory state as Florida, without
touching upon jurisdictional and standing issues. Before a trial
court can make any initial custody decision, it must have subject
matter jurisdiction to do so. Florida joins most other states in
following the UCCJEA6, which has its Florida corollary in Florida
Statute § 60.502. Generally speaking (and this could be an entire
article)7 a Florida court has jurisdiction over a child, and can make
an initial custody determination of that child, if Florida is the
“home state” of the child.8This includes children born out of
wedlock.9 To oversimplify, under the UCCJEA, Florida is the
“home state” of the child if the child has been in the state for the
last six months prior to filing, or has been in the state for a period
of six months that ended in the last six months.
This last bit is a little tricky, and is better understood with a
hypothetical. Let us say the Florida court is assessing whether it
has “home state” jurisdiction over a child when presented with a
Petition to Establish Paternity filed on October 1, 2019. Assume all
technical pleading requirements have been met.10
As of the date of filing, the child is living with his
grandmother in Michigan, but only as of June 2, 2019. Prior to that
date, the child lived in Florida and attended school here and had
done so since January 2016. Because the child’s Florida residency
ended less than six months prior to the date the court is deciding
jurisdiction (October 1st back to June 2nd is four months), Florida
6

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. Massachusetts remains a
hold out, following instead the UCCJA.
7
A full discussion would include important exceptions, and limited exceptions,
such as when a Court takes on temporary “emergency jurisdiction” or when a
child does not meet the conditions of “home state” in any jurisdiction.
8
FLA STAT §61.514 (2018).
9
See Baker v. Tunney 201 So.3d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
10
See FLA STAT §61.514 (2018).
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can be found to be the child’s “home state” and the Florida court
has jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination.
IV. STANDING AS A BAR
As indicated above, Florida’s paternity statutes have not
always been available to fathers when they sought to create a legal
relationship between themselves and their children. Currently,
Florida Statute § 742.011, our Paternity Statute, provides standing
to the following persons, “when paternity has not (already) been
established by law or otherwise.” {emphasis added}
 A pregnant woman
 A woman with a minor child
 Any man who has reason to believe he is the father of a
child
 Any child
The qualifier italicized above is critically important, as the
common law in Florida includes a deeply held concept that a child
born into an intact marriage creates the establishment of legal
paternity of that husband to that child. Furthermore, a mother who
marries the reputed father after the birth of a child will result in her
husband being deemed the legal father.11As an important and
enduring corollary to standing, this “legal father”/ husband remains
as an indispensable party to any litigation brought by a putative /
biological father.12
Historically, a child having been born into an “intact
marriage” was a complete bar to a biological father suing for
paternity (legal parental rights), based on standing, when the
Mother was married to another.13 The primary goal was to protect
marriages, and the parochial concept of the “legitimacy” of
children was determined to be so basic and sacrosanct as to wholly
11

See FLA STAT. §742.091 (2018) (states that when a mother marries the
reputed father of a child born out of wedlock that child is legally the husband’s
child); see also FLA STAT. § 382.013(2)(f) (Upon receipt of marriage license,
birth certificate shall be amended “as though the parents were married at the
time of birth.”); see also Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. ex rel. D.A.R. v.
C.M.B., 661 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (for discussion of the limits and what
“reputed” may mean).
12
See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Cummings, 930 So.2d 604 (Fla. 2006).
13
See Slowenski v. Sweeney, 64 So.3e 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); but see
Simmonds v. Perkins, 247 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 2018) (disapproving)); see also
Bellomo v. Gagliano, 815 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
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determine standing, and gave the putative father no rights
whatsoever. The biological father’s rights were suborned if not
downright ignored in this analysis. So too ignored, were the
children’s rights to their biologically connected families and in so
doing, the children’s best interests were, by definition, not
championed.14
There is another way in which father’s paternal rights are
implicated. In addition to the deeply rooted common law concept
that a man married to the mother is the legal father of the child
even when he is not the biological father, there is another way men
become “legal fathers” without court orders. Florida Statute
§742.10 states there is a “presumption of paternity” that arises
when both parties sign the affidavit of parentage at the birth of a
child. This affidavit, usually signed by both parents in the hospital
at or near the time of birth, affirms that the male is the biological
father, and with that, he is placed on the birth certificate as the
father of the child. This creates a presumption of parentage that has
also been held to be quite strong. So strong, that a man who is on a
child’s birth certificate but wants to “take it back” must file a
Petition to Disestablish Paternity to disengage legally from his
parental obligations (and rights). This presumption however,
historically, does not appear to carry the legal heft and import of a
mother being married at the time of the birth. This is likely because
it does not impact the revered “marital relationship” nor the
“legitimacy” of a child.
At least as far as the Florida legal precedents of the last thirty
years dictate, the value to society of a child having two biological
parents is not as strong as ensuring that a child’s legitimacy, once
established, is maintained. Legitimacy has been the primary
governing principle. Fathers attempting to insert themselves into
this sacred territory have been routinely treated as the interlopers
into what are treated as perfectly good marriages, despite the
obvious evidence to the contrary. Historically, many more fathers
failed than succeeded in asserting their parental rights into an
“intact” marriage, in the name of this archaic principle of
“legitimacy”. It appears that finally this morality-based dictum is
14

See Michael v Gerald 491 US 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality) (upheld the
constitutionality of the marital presumption and, in doing so, ruled that
unmarried biological fathers have no constitutionally protected rights to assert
paternity when the mother is married, and even in this fairly extreme case, when
the child thought of the putative father as her own).
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being scrutinized, challenged, stretched, and, some would argue, is
slowly making its way into obsolescence. The factual variety
abounds (even without getting into same sex parentage, surrogacy
parentage, and adoptions). Currently legal fathers may be
biological fathers or may not be biological fathers (eg. men listed
on the birth certificate and/or a husband in an intact marriage). The
plight and progress of putative / potentially biological fathers is the
primary legal battle to be examined in this article.
Again, when potential fathers seek to lay claim to rights over
children when the mother is married, the situation may be best
referred to involving a “quasi-marital child”.15 As is the case in all
legal areas, subtle differences in facts often drive the outcomes in
legal precedents and cases that appear to stand for one outcome,
fail to support that outcome over time. For example, to discuss the
seminal case Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.
Privette,16 in its full context, one must first look to the case of
Gammon v. Cobb.17 When looking at the cases that would follow
for the next decade and a half, one would have thought that the
essential Gammon facts could easily have led to another result.
In Gammon18 the mother sought to establish paternity in order
to obtain child support from the biological father of her seven
children. There was already a legal father, as she was married, but
she had not had any contact with her husband in 20 years. Her suit
was dismissed at the trial level as Florida Statute §742, the
paternity statute, required her to be an unmarried female plaintiff.
The Florida Supreme Court in Gammon notes that the statute
indeed contemplates a “unmarried” female petitioner, and the
presumption of legitimacy flowing from her being married is “one
of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known to law.”19 The
Court notes in determining the constitutionality of Fla. Stat.§742
that allowing married women to sue other men for paternity would
entail them de-legitimizing the child at issue, but that societal
norms had so developed that being considered “illegitimate” was
likely better than having seven more children on the public dole.20
15

McKenney, supra note 4.
Dep’t of Health and Rehab.Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1993).
17
Gammon, supra note 2.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 264
20
This concept, that illegitimacy could be worse than not being financially
provided for is a concept that hung on with tenacity. See Grant v. Jones 635
So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
16
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Additionally, in this scenario, there are seven children who would
be de facto fatherless, as her husband does not appear to have
taken that role. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the portion of Fla. Stat. §742 requiring the woman suing to be
“unmarried” violated the equal protection clause, was
unconstitutional, and struck that portion down.21
Cracks in the presumption of legitimacy conferred by a
marriage were inevitable. In the case Barnes v. Frazie,22 the
presumption of the legitimacy of a child born during a mother’s
intact marriage was all but ignored, where the married mother
openly acknowledged the putative father as the biological father
and where she was not attempting to use Fla. Stat. §742 as a sword
in their custody dispute. Other cases still sought to differentiate
their facts for just results, such as Matter of Adoption Baby Doe,23
wherein a biological father (proven by DNA), who had been
paying support, wanted to stop the adoption (to third parties) of a
child he had with a married woman. The appellate court found a
way to provide him standing.24
The seminal Florida case that is the cornerstone of the current
established law in this area is Privette25. This case has had
enduring, if not always clear-cut, influence on cases to follow. It is
pivotal in that it reflected a 180 degree turn away from the
Gammon court’s pragmatic approach to the conundrum presented
by the quasi- marital child. The facts are simple. In Privette, the
State of Florida sought to collect back child support, (whereas
Gammon had been a private action by the mother). The State of
Florida, through the Department of Revenue, sued the biological
father for repayment of public assistance the state had provided to
the mother. This type of state action is so mundane as to literally
take place every day of the week in every corner of this state. The
mother was married to another man when the child was born, so, in
accordance with Florida law, it was her husband and not the
biological father who was listed on the birth certificate as the
father of the child.26 The State, without acknowledging the mother
was married to another, requested that the trial court order the
21

Gammon, supra note 2 at 269.
Barnes v. Frazier, 509 So.2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
23
Matter of Adoption Baby Doe 572 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
24
While still pointing out that at that time an unwed father was not similarly
situated to an unwed mother. Id. at 988.
25
Privette, supra note 16.
26
Florida Statute §382.013(2).
22
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parties to submit to scientific DNA paternity testing to prove
parentage.
This routine request for scientific testing is so commonplace
to our ears today, we must put some real effort into remembering
that DNA testing was anything but commonplace in the law up
until this time. In the 1960s, highly accurate genetic paternity
testing became a possibility for the first time when HLA typing
was developed. HLA compares the genetic fingerprints on white
blood cells between the child and alleged parent. Even more
accurate DNA parental testing became available in the 1980s with
the development of RFLP. Then in the 1990s, PCR27 became the
standard method for DNA parental testing. PCR is a simpler,
faster, and more accurate method of testing than RFLP,28 and has
an exclusion rate of 99.99% or higher. This DNA testing
technology was not immediately accepted in forensic settings, of
course. Results of DNA testing and comparison was first used to
successfully convict a criminal defendant in 1987 when Tommie
Lee Andrews was convicted of rape in Orange County Florida.
This is all hard to keep in mind, given the ease and ubiquity of
DNA testing in every type of forensic and non-forensic setting
today. A DNA testing for paternity determination is now widely
available, requires only a quick swab of the mouth of parent and
child, costs less than $200, and can be done at any number of labs
available in most towns.
It is fitting then, that this seminal and enduring Florida
Supreme Court case dealing with quasi-marital children is born of
the era when technology was first being used to easily,
inexpensively and reliably answer the question of who is the
biological father of the child. It would be much easier to continue
to keep putative fathers from “busting” up families if it continued
to be impossible to definitively determine the identity of the true
biological father. The advent of readily available, non-invasive and
dependable paternity testing, more and more frequently obtained
by the parties without a court order, has had significant impact
working in the background of these legal developments.29

27

PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction, first developed in 1983.
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism
29
Fermandez, Judge Alterbrand, footnote 11. See also I.A. v. H.H. 710 So.2d 162
(Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (showing clearly how DNA results can change outcomes
when judges could not have definitively known who the biological father was).
28
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In Privette,30 the Florida Supreme Court ignored its previous
logic in Gammon entirely, and looked to the more elusive,
ephemeral and paternalistic goal of protecting the legitimacy of the
child. Once again, the siren call of legitimacy sounded in Florida.
“[W]e cannot agree that the State can risk plunging children into
the stigma of illegitimacy and undermining parental rights for no
better reason than appears on the present record. A good deal more
is required.” The concept of “best interests” in Privette31 has
nothing to do with ensuring financial security for the child or in the
child having a father; it is singularly implicated the central
principle of legitimacy itself.
A reminder that the apparent goal of Gammon,32 was not to
protect the child’s legitimacy but to protect the child’s right to
financial support. This particular goal was roundly derided by the
Privette Court, “[t]his case is about impugning the legitimacy of a
child for the sake of money allegedly owed to the State of
Florida.”33 It is clear the Florida Supreme Court was irritated that
the State actor was sloppy in its pleading and presentation, and that
it ignored wholly the legal hurdles inherent, ie. that the husband /
legal father was in the picture (and likely technically obligated to
support this child). IF the case had involved the financially
strapped and child burdened mother as in Gammon, or if the trial
court had perhaps made a better record; perhaps the outcome could
have been different.
The procedure set out by the Supreme Court in Privette,34
essentially adopted the district court’s ruling, and was the new
procedure for dealing with the standing issue in quasi- marital
children cases. This would be for putative fathers, or for a thirdparty actor wanting to remove the mantel of legal fatherhood from
husbands and set it down on other men’s shoulders. Prior to a trial
court ordering DNA testing, it must hold a full evidentiary hearing
to determine, by clear and compelling evidence, the best interests
of the child, together with the appointment of and full investigation
by a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL).35

30

Privette, supra note 16.
Privette, supra note 16.
32
McKenney, supra note 4.
33
Privette, supra note 16 at 305.
34
Privette, supra note 16.
35
Privette, supra note 16 at 308.
31
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Again, the focus being on the process to acquire DNA testing
underscores the seismic shift this new technology brought. Cases
pre-Privette would not have dealt with this issue at all. The
standard set out in Privette did not foreclose a putative father
bringing such an action, although it does not state such
specifically. This third-party actor case still promoted the idea that
the presumption of legitimacy was, always, rebuttable and not an
excuse for courts to dismiss cases prematurely. The language that
some courts used continued to evolve, softening the “presumption
language”, and courts started to consider who was available to
actually parent the child.36 As much as the central ruling of
Privette was DNA testing, which leads to the definitive truth about
parentage, Privette is still cited in many cases that stand for the
premise that the truth of paternity is relegated to “irrelevance”.37 It
is difficult to know if this is because the jurists making these
decisions were depending on a history of cases made pre-DNA, or
if these decisions were really grounded in the safer but
nevertheless outdated idea of preserving traditional concepts of
“intact marriages” and legitimacy at all costs. It’s ironic really,
that the judicial efforts expended to obstruct and prevent biological
fathers from asserting and obtaining parental rights were made in
order to protect marriages that were sufficiently flawed to allow
wives to become pregnant by men who are not their husbands.
During the development of the law related to invading this
presumption of legitimacy from the outside, there was the
development of the other side of the coin. Legal fathers were also
actively seeking ways out of their parentage and financial
obligations. In this way too, DNA testing brought clarity and
heartbreak to many families. Fathers who became suspicious could
use DNA technology to learn, to their joy or disappointment, that
they were or were not biologically connected to the child they had
been parenting.38 Some men made a heartbreaking decision that
they did not want to “support another man’s child”. As more men
attempted to lay legal claim to their child born during the mother’s
marriage to another man, so too were husbands and legal fathers
endeavoring to terminate child support obligations by using DNA
36

J.T.H. v. N.H. 84 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
C.G. v. J.R. 130 So.3d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
38
As DNA company Identigene says in its marketing material, “Putting your
mind at ease has never been more convenient, affordable or accurate.” New
York times magazine article November 17, 2009.
37
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paternity testing as a shield rather than a sword. As the law slowly
thawed to allowing putative fathers to make a case in Court as to
why they should be determined the legal father, so too did the law
warm up to those who wanted out of that legal relationship.
The Florida Supreme Court in the groundbreaking case of
Daniel v. Daniel,39 continued the degradation of the “sanctity of
legitimacy” by significantly expanding the possibilities for men
who sought to avoid child support obligations. In Daniel, the
husband / legal father married the mother knowing that the child to
be born three months later was not his own.40 Pursuant to
Privette,41 the trial court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem who
ultimately opined that the legal father was in a better position to
take care of the child financially. It appears that neither biological
or legal father wanted to assert any “parental rights” so the Court
just behaved as if the child support obligation was separate from
the legal fatherhood. Meaning you can take a man off the hook
financially through disestablishment, while still considering the
child born legally to that man and legitimate. The appellate court
allowed the non- biological father to be relieved of his financial
responsibility for the child because said responsibility was not
“voluntarily undertaken”.42 In separating the concepts of
“paternity” and “legitimacy”, the Florida Supreme Court made it
easier for legal but non-biological fathers to avoid unwanted
financial responsibilities. The bulwark of the traditional
“legitimacy” principle continued to crack.
So just four years after Privette, the Florida Supreme court,
which had created steep barriers for biological fathers seeking the
privileges and benefits of parentage, held that, when uncontested,
the legal father may walk fairly simply out of that legal
relationship.43 Daniel, perhaps unintentionally, may have also
provided robust ammunition for biological fathers trying to

39

Daniel v. Daniel 695 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1997).
N.H., supra note 36.
41
See Privette, supra note 16.
42
N.H., supra note 36.
43
Daniel is discussed in many disestablishment cases, wherein legal fathers seek
to avoid their legal obligations and “disestablish” their paternity. Daniel was
decided prior to the establishment of the requirements of the disestablishment
statute Florida Statute §742.18. While not overriding any of the Daniel
principles, this statute does include very particular pleading and procedural
guidelines that must be followed.
40
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establish paternity.44 This appears to be the definitive legal
separation of the principle of “legitimacy” from the principle of
“paternity”. The Court found, conveniently for this “legal” father,
that there is a difference between legitimacy, which reflects the
public policy desire that children have a recognized father, and
paternity, which establishes formal rights and responsibilities
holding that “paternity and legitimacy are related, but are
nevertheless separate and distinct concepts.45
V. POST PRIVETTE AND DANIELS
In the years since Privette and Daniels, courts have moved
towards a greater acknowledgement of the importance of keeping
the children’s best interests in the foreground. Although Privette
included a GAL component, which would typically mean a “best
interests” determination, that evaluation was still centered on
whether the loss of “legitimacy” was in the child’s best interests.
Courts appear more and more to have finally begun to address the
genuine best interests of children, not the theoretical moral
interests, but the quality of life that the child will have (and not just
financially) in a given outcome. Concurrent with that development,
and not coincidentally, the law has begun to really speak to the
value of a father’s relationship with his child.
The slow move away from legitimacy and into real world best
interests’ considerations was not uniform. From 2002, for example
there are decisions like that in RHB v. JBW.46 In RHB, the
appellate court upheld the traditional old school holding that when
the mother is married at birth of child, the putative father had no
standing to bring suit under Florida Statute §742. This case just
ignores a wealth of more nuanced situations in which biological
fathers have been found to have standing, and have prevailed in
exactly those types of paternity cases. In other cases, the Courts
have ignored the standing issue, and instead created additional
44

Because if non-biology is enough to take the legal and custodial father away
from a child, how can one not argue biology is the guiding factor? See P.G. v.
E.W. 75 So.3d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (Child born prior to the marriage,
husband signed birth certificate. Divorce later and he takes on primary
residential custody. Court finds that DNA test showing child is not the father’s is
“newly discovered evidence” and grants of petition to disestablish paternity of
7-year-old living with petitioner).
45
Privette, supra note 16.
46
RHB v. JBW 826 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
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barriers, such as requiring allegations that the legal father had
abused or abandoned the child.47
Despite those throwback cases, there has been an overall shift
away from use of standing as a total bar to actions brought by
putative fathers, albeit not always without some moralizing. In
C.G. v. J.R. 48the Second District Court of Appeal uses a newer
sounding “best interests” language, but it is also clear that the
circumstances surrounding the quasi-marital child are less than
impressive to the court. The mother in this case was married at
time the child is born. The husband was also listed on the birth
certificate as the father of the child. Putative father, C.G., filed his
paternity action.49 Interestingly, in a creative move ahead of its
time, the two biological parents and the husband entered into a
three-way agreement giving both men timesharing rights, which
the trial court approved. The agreement was entered into by mother
and bio dad during her separation from the husband, and appears to
acknowledge the complicated family reality that this child had two
men in her life who loved her like a father. After a dispute arose,
the trial court changed course and found the agreement
unenforceable as it would create a “dual paternity”, meaning two
fathers. After input from a Guardian Ad Litem as to who should
win in the daddy competition, the trial court found that the legal
father/husband would remain the only legal father, and the Second
District affirmed this decision.
The C.G. court appeared to consider the origins of this mess,
in that the biological father happened to be the wife and husband’s
“business partner”. This illicit office romance and resulting “who’s
the daddy” question had been kept from the Husband for some
time, while he innocently, and genuinely fulfilled his father role.
The result is quite dramatic, as the child and the biological father
had been engaged in timesharing since the birth of the child. The
trial court followed the recommendations of the appointed
Guardian ad Litem and ultimately decided that between the two
“fathers,” the legal father / Husband was the better parental choice.
An important finding was that the child had lived solely with him
47

GFC v. S.G 686 So.2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
C.G. v. J.R. 130 So.3d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
49
This combo of rebuttable presumption under §742.10 and also the common
law strong presumption of legitimacy for a married father, appears in some cases
as a super factor. Perhaps courts consider this to signify the intactness of the
marriage, and arguably, the innocence of the husband, and perhaps a resulting
bond with the child.
48
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for two years at this point. The Court also found, dubiously given
the history of the family, that this continued placement would
protect the “presumption of legitimacy”.
The reality was that all aspects of the actual biological
paternity had been hashed out, agreed to and written down by the
parties. The three parents, as they defined themselves, had lived a
much messier reality than “one legal father, one legal mother” for
some time. It appears that when faced with disputes between three
“parents” the trial court determined there was just one too many
moving parts that could not be reasonably parsed out when
disputes arose. Likely those issues are not, at the heart of it, any
more difficult or complicated than any other post-agreement
disputes between two parents. For now, however, it appears that
best interests’ determinations, although they are becoming as
important as “legitimacy”, are not enough to overcome the
concerns about dual fatherhood. As we will see this is not so, it
would seem, with mommies.
Interestingly, even as the C.G. court agrees that the parties’
agreement produces an unacceptable “dual paternity”, the appellate
court cites T.M.H. v. D.M.T.50, which was affirmed by the Florida
Supreme Court ultimately in D.M.T. v. T.M.H.51 If the three-way
parental contract of C.G. was deemed by trial courts as too much to
deal with, the facts of T.M.H. and D.M.T. will bring on the vapors.
Essentially both cases deal with a lesbian couple having a child
that was brought to term in one woman’s body with eggs supplied
by the other. Although the holding in T.H.M. was specifically
relating to the definition of the word “donor”, and the
constitutionality of the statue vis-à-vis two women in this
particular circumstance, this case still has huge impact for the
fundamental constitutional rights afforded to biological parents (in
that case the Court finding both women to be biological mothers
and afforded constitutional rights to their child).52 The C.G. Court
did not appear to read T.M.H as a “dual mother case” in the way
they considered dual fatherhood, or they decided that due to
biological facts, there would never be a corollary “two biological
father” situation. Of course, that is a factual scenario that science
does not, yet, foresee. If the sanctity of biology means that two
women can both have maternal rights, essentially dual
50

T.M.H. v. D.M.T. 79 So.3d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).
D.M.T. v. T.M.H. 129 So.3d 320 (Fla. 2013).
52
Id at 338.
51
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motherhood, then how can it be that we deny fatherhood to the
only father with a biological connection just because there may be
a resulting messy two fathers situation? Certainly, given that a
child can, fairly easily have two mothers53 and one father, the
potential for three parent situations is just a minor factual
adjustment away.54 It is possible other jurisdictions may look at
things differently. The Fifth District court of Appeals in Posik v.
Layton,55 for example, found that cohabitation agreements between
an adult gay couple was enforceable.
The Third district conveniently found that the Florida
Supreme Court holding in T.M.H applied only to situations
wherein Florida Statute §742 was applied when two women had a
child in that exact factual scenario. Meaning still just two parents,
they just happened to both be women. This incredibly narrow
reading arguably misses the forest for the trees. And seems to
ignore those missed trees that are only male, as two men will never
have an opportunity to biologically procreate in this way, they
appear foreclosed from dual paternity unlike their female
counterparts.56
Other specific factual scenarios have allowed for the softening
of appellate courts in this area and for the gradual expansion of
putative father’s rights, and consider also relationship and
responsibility. For example, in Nevitt v. Bonomo,57 where the
mother was divorced at the time of the birth of the child at issue,
her marriage arguably not being “intact” at the time of conception.
During the pregnancy, the putative biological father sued for
paternity and alleged in his petition for paternity that he had
provided financial assistance to the mother and alleged he showed
a “manifested a substantial concern for the welfare of the child.”58
53

Id.
Particularly since courts have now upheld the validity of stepparent adoptions
for lesbian couples, when only one is the biological parent. See In re Adoption
of D.P.P. 158 So.3d 633 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
55
Posik v. Layton 695 So.2d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
56
This should not be confused with foreclosing two men achieving dual
fatherhood by way of stepparent adoption, which is currently available to male
couples in the state of Florida and is achieved in various ways, surrogacy,
adoption by both parties, etc. The fact that this vehicle actually results in dual
fathers likely will have impacts in future cases such as C.G….perhaps it is more
accurate now that courts disdain “triple parentage”.
57
Nevitt v. Bonomo 53 So.3d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
58
Id at 1081.
54
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This terminology would become, if not magic, then certainly
the developing standard. This developing standard reflects the
courts’ slow and creaking turn away from moralizing, to look to
the actual care of the child shown by the putative father. In this
case all three parties admitted the child was the biological child of
the petitioner. The mother wanted to have the child adopted by a
fourth party. In order to strengthen their case, she and her exhusband went so far as to have their Final Judgment of Dissolution
vacated. By doing this, the mother ensured that her former husband
would be deemed the “presumed legal” father of the child. Indeed,
the trial Court dismissed the petition for paternity for lack of
standing. The appellate court reversed, finding standing based on
the facts alleged and acknowledged in the pleadings; including that
the legal father and mother were separated for extended time at
birth, the biology was known, and financial support being provided
by the biological father.59
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Florida is relatively unusual in that it has a right to privacy
specifically provided in its constitution60, being one of eight states
where this is the case.61 This has been reflected in the areas of
family law in a myriad of ways. The termination of a parents’
highly protected rights to a child is a high bar and hurdle for the
State, or private petitioners, in termination of parental rights action,
and includes a higher standard of proof and right to effective
assistance of counsel.62 State actions in dependency, wherein the

59

It is important to note that the decision of the appellate court did not result,
necessarily, in a “win” for the petitioner, because it was based on the pleadings
and standing alone. Adequate pleadings in this area, more than ever, may make
critical difference in the outcome of cases.
60
Added in 1980, Article I section 23 “Every natural person has the right to be
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit
the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.”
61
Others being Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Washington. National
Conference of State Legislation, Privacy Protections in State Constitutions
November 7, 2018.
62
In Re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. 658 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1995) citing Florida
Constitution Amendments 5 and 14 “We recognize the sanctity of the biological
connection, and we look carefully at anything that would sever the biological
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Department of Children and Families alleges a parent is currently
unfit to have custody of a child, although less permanent and
serious than termination actions, also entail a right to counsel
under statute, (although not necessarily competent counsel).63 The
Florida Supreme Court has found that when a father participates in
raising child, his rights to contact are constitutionally protected.64
Courts have repeatedly found that parental rights based on
biological relationship are inchoate.65Courts have repeatedly found
that equal protection principles are not offended by the current
version of Florida Statute §742, although one wonders about
whether the realities of this “equal standing” between mothers and
fathers, given the obvious advantage mothers have in the “control”
over children born to them.66 Beyond due process considerations,
there has not appeared to be deep dives into the constitutional
implications, in the area of equal protection, in the cases dealing
with the quasi-marital child and the fathers who attempt to assert
their rights.67
VII. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Courts in more recent years have appeared to wade further
into the facts than the old “standing” based decisions, which
allowed trial courts to throw cases out based merely on pleadings
and technical definitions. While this may lead to more subjectivity,
parent-child link.” Id at 967 ; See also J.B. v. DCF 158 So.3d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA
2014).
63
S.B. v. DCF, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003).
64
In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla. 1989); D.M.T v. T.M. H 129
So.3d 320 (Fla 2013) “The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have
infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing
it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently
vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases. But see G.F.C. v.
S.G. 686 So.2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) “We reject (the) claim of a
constitutional right to assert paternity” when the only relationship is “biological
fatherhood” , citing Michael H. v. Gerald 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)).
65
Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996);”; State v. J.P. v. L.P. 907 So.2d
1101 (Fla. 2005); Russell v. Pasik 178 So.3d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
66
Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla. 1989); Nevitt v. Bonomo, 53 So. 3d
1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)); L.J. v. A.S., 25 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010);
G.F.C. v. S.G.; 686 So. 2d 1382 ((Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Wooley v. City of Baton
Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923-24 (5th Cir. 2000).
67
Kendrick v. Everheart 390 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1980) being an important exception,
and dealing directly with equal protection issues.
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it allows for a more thorough consideration of all circumstances,
and looking at real world advantages aside from theoretical
moralistic interests. This has allowed more creativity by Courts
attempting to “do the right thing” for children (and fathers).
An example of this is the only case currently citing to C.G.
(adulterer business partner)68, and which has a very different
outcome. The Court in DOR v. L.M.M.69 comes to a completely
different result, based on fairly minor factual distinctions and a
further downgrading of the role of the presumption of legitimacy.
In L.M.M., the State of Florida through the Department of Revenue
filed a paternity action on behalf of a mother against a putative
father, despite her having been married at the time of the birth of
the child (sounds like Privette, no?) Despite having cited C.G., the
Second district in L.M.M. found for the State and held that the
putative father was the legal father on the following grounds: 1)
the husband was not on the birth certificate (she was married and
this “oversight” was not explained) and 2) finding that the
“presumption of legitimacy” was merely “implicated” by her
having been married at the birth of the child (what happen to being
a complete bar to standing C.G.?). The appellate court pointed out
that any presumption can be overcome or rebutted.70 Either this is a
seismic shift in thinking for all kinds of cases, or the courts have
more difficulty denying mothers financial support than denying
biological fathers relationships with their children. Of course, for
every paternity granted for support purposes, there is a father who
now may sue for parental rights and timesharing using similar
logic.
The most recent word out of the Florida Supreme Court on
this topic is Simmonds v. Perkins.71 Ushering in what appears to be
the new standard and definition of the path to paternity for putative
fathers. The presumption of paternity (legitimacy) belonging to the
husband when a child is born to that intact marriage, is rebuttable
when the putative father has “manifested a substantial and
continuing concern for the welfare of the child” and when there is
68

C.G. supra note 48.
DOR v. L.M.M., 192 So.3d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
70
And certainly, this mental leap is shorter now that Daniel has explained that
once a child is legitimate, they shall always remain.
71
Simmonds v. Perkins 247 So.3d 397 (Fla. 2018) Approving Perkins v.
Simmonds 227 So.3d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) and disapproving Slowinski v.
Sweeney 64 So.3d 128 (Fla. 1st 2011) and Tejerino v. State 843 So.2d 984 (Fla.
3rd 2003).
69
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a clear and compelling reason, based primarily on the child’s best
interests”(emphasis added).72 It is hard to know what part of the
morality of the players will have an ongoing effect on the results of
this newer, more specific and fact intensive approach. In
Simmonds, there was no question that the biological father was
faultless, he had a three-year relationship with the mother, whom
he thought was single. The adulterer was duped this time. The
biological father was at the birth and assisted in the raising of the
child. The biological father was the only father the child knew.73
In Simmonds, the Florida Supreme Court took issue with
Florida court’s continued practice of dismissing these cases based
on standing, rather than follow the “Kendrick test”, and looking
more quickly and closely to children’s best interests. As a review
of Kendrick reveals that barely more than dicta actually related
directly to these issues, it is understandable that trial courts were
not reading it the way the Simmonds Court seemed to.
It is true that Kendrick v. Everheart74 is a case about a father
suing for paternity rights over a child born to an intact marriage.
But the ruling did not directly address biological father’s rights to
their children, but instead the equal protection issues related to
Florida Statute § 742. The issue in Kendrick for the Supreme Court
was whether men could utilize section §742 to obtain parental
rights, when the plain reading of the statute was that this was a
vehicle for mothers to obtain financial assistance from fathers.75
The Florida Supreme Court found that the statute allowing a
mother and a mother alone to sue for financial support was not a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution,
but that a father should not be precluded from using the statute to
establish his paternity by way of “declaratory judgment”.76 The
Supreme Court, having dealt with the matter at hand, goes on to
comment that putative fathers remain in a legal position subjugated
by the positions of mother and husband, but that times are
changing. They go on to provide, without significant discussion,
that the father at hand had shown standing by way of having

72

Id at 9.
Id.
74
Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1980).
75
It is hard to imagine a more compelling set of facts, given the putative father
was actually in custody of the five children at issue and had been raising and
supporting them solely.
76
Kendrick, supra note 74.
73
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manifested a substantial and continuing concern for the welfare of
his children.77
It is not difficult to understand that lower courts may not have
read this case as the “pathway to standing” that the Simmonds
Court, decades later, concludes. The discussion of “manifested a
substantial and continuing concern” in Kendrick is brief, at the end
of a discussion about equal protection, and not clearly identified as
a new standard for courts to consider. The Simmonds court
reconfirms, in much stronger terms, the standard of care the
putative father’s must show, that of manifest substantial and
continued concern for the child and the child’s actual best
interests.78 The Court also discounts further the legal presumption
of paternity, and specifically, the objections of the mother and
husband/legal father. In other words, the Supreme Court urges
fewer legalistic dismissals based on standing, and more thoughtful
consideration of who has actually parented and cared for the child
and the good faith actions of the putative father. On the other hand,
the Court also made clear that simple biology was not enough, and
a clear and compelling reason to overcome the presumption of
paternity (legitimacy) is needed, biology notwithstanding.
Basically, a “mini-trial” is now required two determine the
standing of the hopeful father on these issues, but once the “legal
father” presumption is overcome it would appear that the
biological, not the legal father, will ultimately prevail.79
The Simmonds opinion came at a time when other lower
appellate courts had already begun to focus on best interests, such
as the decision in DOR v. Iglesias80 and Fernandez v. Fernandez.81
Few cases on these issues have been reported since Simmonds and
none provide further insight into how the Courts are going to
actually determine what is “manifest substantial and continuing
concern” or “clear and compelling” reasons sufficient to overcome
presumption of legitimacy, or even “best interests” in this context.
It remains to be seen whether courts will be expected to make
specific findings on particular factors, such as those set out in
Florida Statute §61.16 (timesharing) and, if so, if the courts will be
expected to actually compare the two potential fathers. It seems
77

Simmonds, supra note 71.
Simmonds, supra note 71.
79
Simmonds, supra note 71.
80
DOR v. Iglesias 77 So.3d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
81
Fernandez v. Fernandez 857 So.2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
78
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certain that the Simmonds approach would have led to different
results potentially in various prior cases.82 One of the more recent
cases of note is In the Interest of M.L.H.83, a heartbreaking and
unusual case wherein the biological father, who was also on the
child’s birth certificate, was denied standing in a dependency
action by the trial court. This is even while the mother and legal
father’s rights being terminated leaving the child parentless and
presumably in foster care. This was also a case wherein the
putative father appeared to act in good faith and was without
blame. The appellate court, based on Simmonds, reversed.84
VIII. WHAT ARE PUTATIVE FATHERS TO DO?
What kind of facts will prove to be the most important for a
putative father to achieve standing under Simmonds and surmount
the barriers to paternity of quasi-marital children? This may be a
good starting list:
a. While detailed pleading of standing needed, insist on
evidentiary hearing that is likely required.85
b. Moving quickly to assert claims / file paternity.86
c. This would include properly joining legal fathers.87
d. Intactness of the marriage.88
82

It is difficult to know how many cases that have been determined against
clearly meritorious biological fathers on standing grounds, such as JAI v. BR
160 So.3d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) were they to come to court post-Simmonds.
83
See In the Interest of M.L.H. 2018 WL 3672945 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
84
Id.
85
See L.J. v. State 25 So.3d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); J.T.L. v. N.H. 84 So.3d
1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); In the Interest of M.L.H. 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1782
(Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
86
See M.L. v. DCF 227 So.3d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (noting distinction to
J.T.J. v. N.H. 84 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); In the interest of M.L.H. 43
Fla. L. Weekly D1782 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2018).
87
Drouin v Stuber 168 So.3d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) Remembering that the
right of joinder as the indispensable party belongs to the legal father / husband
“Constitutional rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously” citing
Epstein v. Bank 162 So. 3d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
88
See Fernandez v. Fernandez 857 So.2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (although
this does not appear clear cut as to whether separation is sufficient, and whether
it matters that the separation did not come until after the conception) Courts
have taken a more pragmatic approach as of late, questioning the assumptions of
“intactness” . (when there is a geographical separation that precludes
conception, such as in Fernandez II).
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e. Failure, or not, of legal father to support and spend time
with child.89
f. Biological/putative father listed on birth certificate or legal
father signing “fraudulently”.90
g. Agreement of the mother and, even more so, a continuing
committed relationship between putative father and mother.91
h. Financial support to the mother.92
i. Timesharing and a developed relationship with the child.93
j. Innocence (not knowingly having affair with married
woman in “intact relationship”).94
k. DNA test results.95
l. Reputation of the putative father (or legal father) as
“father” to the world. 96
89

See Fernandez v. Fernandez 857 So.2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); G.F.C. v.
S.G. 686 So.2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (I.S. H.H 701 So.2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA
1998).
90
Supra note 83 and a case one hopes will forever be limited to the exact facts at
hand A.D.A. v. D.M.F. 204 So.3d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) wherein the legal
father was determined to be dispositive, despite fraud being difficult to prove.
Also of interest is the court’s insistence that the husband having fraudulently
signed the birth certificate affidavit would negate his claim as legal
father…while at the same time finding that the Mother would be estopped from
making the argument that the legal father was not the father (citing Flores v.
Sanchez 137 So.3d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Father fraudulently signs birth
certificate, meaning should not get to claim legal fatherhood, and if mother
allows him to fraudulently, then she cannot dispute his legal fatherhood. It is
nonsensical. This is also a case that could make a reasonable jurist wish they had
a fourth parental option.
91
See Fernandez v. Fernandez 857 So.2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), even better
when they are married.
92
C.G., supra note 48.
93
C.G., supra note 48 (with Simmonds “best interests” analysis, could this not
become the “super factor”?)
94
C.G., supra note 48; See also I.A. v. H.H. 710 So.2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
95
See A.S. v. S.F. 4 So.3d 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (including emphasis on the
timing of the test, prior to Mother marrying “legal” father. (I.A. v. H.H. 710
So.2d 162 (blood test done by agreement to potentially foreclose putative father,
he attempted use as sword under Fl statute 742.12 (DNA presumption).
Fernandez v. Fernandez 857 So.2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
96
See In the interest of M.L.H. 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018);
A.S. v. S.F. 4 So.3d 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009 (which provides a definition of
“reputed father”: “the individual generally or widely believed or considered to
be the biological father of a particular child.” I.A. v. H.H. 710 So.2d 162 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998) (and this is the case even though the mother did not marry the
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m. Having registered with Florida Putative Father registry.97
n. GAL opinion.98 But keep in mind, a GAL may not be
required.99
IX. TIMES CHANGE
When the winds of change blow, some people build walls and
other’s windmills – Chinese Proverb. Despite the enormous
changes of the last thirty plus years and the strides taken in making
statutes more gender neutral and with specific changes to the law
in the family arena to even the playing field in custody fights, it
has been difficult to shake the vestiges of “mother” as the real and
more important parent. This has slowed the father’s movement to
get truly equal rights in timesharing and other parental rights,
including asserting their rights over quasi-marital children of intact
marriages. Statutes that remain on the books, such as Florida
Statute §744.301(1), reveal the lingering “mommy” bias in the
system and the law. This Statute states “the mother of a child born
out of wedlock is the natural guardian of the child and is entitled to
primary residential care and custody of the child unless the court
enters an order stating otherwise.”
This provision has been read in more recent times as merely
asserting that a mother of a child born out of wedlock is entitled to
primary custody until there is an initial hearing and the first court
order finding paternity and directing timesharing (as opposed to
the mother receiving sole custody forever or until the final
judgment is entered).100 Similarly, Florida Statute §742.0312
husband/legal father until after the birth of the child, keeping in mind Florida
Statue 742.091).
97
See In the interest of M.L.H. 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)..
98
G.F.C., 686 So.2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) Interestingly, although Privette
appears to almost mandate a GAL for best interest’s determination of the
having-bio-dad vs. losing legitimacy evaluation, there are very few cases
wherein a GAL appears to have been involved. This author’s anecdotal
experience is that GALs are very rarely actually involved in these cases
currently. Likely, when requested, particularly by “legal” parents, it is
necessary. See I.A. v. H.H, 710 So.2d 162 (Fla 2d DCA 1998).
99
DOR v. Iglesias 77 So.3d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (pointing out that Privette
appears to require a GAL but then immediately indicating that if there is no
GAL the Court must evaluate best interests itself).
100
Steward v. Walker 5 So.3d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) invites the reading into
Florida Statute 744.301(1) the unwritten additional contempt, that if a unwed
father demonstrates and carries out the requisite settled purpose to be a father, he
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indicates that if a judgment of paternity contains only child
support, even though this would require a paternity finding, the
mother still retains the right to all time-sharing over the child and
has sole parental responsibility without prejudice. The father in
that situation would have to file a Petition to Establish Paternity
and to establish a time-sharing schedule in order to receive and
exercise paternal rights.
Once the unwed parents are in paternity litigation,
theoretically they have comparable ability to prove that any
particular timesharing schedule is in the child’s best interests.101
But likely biases from the “tender years” era remain.102 The
“tender years doctrine”, set out in Dinkel v. Dinkel103 required
courts to provide mothers of younger, infants “prime
consideration” in custody matters.104 The judges who make these
determinations, of course, are human and largely reflect the
societal norms and attitudes of their times. It is still the case that
more than half of Americans see mothers as doing a better job than
fathers in the parenting role, and only 1% see fathers as doing a
better job.105 The joint power of the statutes, case law, and
historical preferences inapposite to biological father’s rights have
created significant and entrenched legal barriers to putative fathers
hoping to lay claim to a married man’s legal child. Biological
fathers have persevered and continued to seek rights to their

comes within the first sentence, and is now an equal guardian to the mother.
Citing State v. Earl, 649 So.2d 297(Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In the Steward case
however, even with a generous reading of 744.301, the father was found to lack
standing to sue for tortious interference with his custody, as the mother was
presumed the custodial parent under Florida Statute 742.031. This portion of the
holding would seem to be limited to cases wherein there are Title IV child
support orders entered after findings of paternity.
101
Florida Statute 61.13 (1983 and 1991) as discussed in Kuuitti v. Kuuitti 645
So.2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Ayyash v. Ayyash 700 So.2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA
1997).
102
This “doctrine” was enshrined in the case law until superseded by Florida
Statute 61.13 (1983). Courts had a hard time giving up this sexist notion even
after the 1994 changes to Chapter 61.13. See DeCamp v. Hein 541 So.2d 708n
(Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (coming around with a full abrogation on the doctrine in
Cherradi v. Lavoie 662 So.2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
103
Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1975).
104
Id at 24.
105
Pew Research Center Seven Facts about American Dads by Kim Parker and
Gretchen Livingston (June 13, 2018).

2019]

Paternity and the Quasi-Marital Child

25

children, and slowly then, have wound a narrow and precarious
path forward for themselves and all others behind them.
A. THE BOLDER FUTURE
There is no end to the potential family make-up. Between
same sex adoptions, surrogacies, and children born and being
raised by multiple parents, the law lags behind in its consideration
of ground rules that will further the needs and bests interests of the
children, rather than the adults who love them. Anecdotally,
families have entered locally into the type of “two dads” agreement
that was central to the C.G. v. J.R.106 case, as is surely happening
elsewhere, even with uncertainty about what local judges will do if
these agreements go south. It is impossible to know how many
adult children have been on the happy receiving end of such
progressive “three parent” arrangements that are just not talked
about. It appears that this type of agreement would not receive a
judicial seal of approval currently, in at least the Second District
(given the opinion in C.G. v. J.R), but it is unclear where else this
type of agreement may be enforceable, or what future courts will
decide should be done with these complex, but voluntary, family
arrangements. It puts families and children in a very difficult
position if they are forced to negotiate in good faith an
arrangement that leaves the child with more parents to love and
support them, only to have that turn to dust when someone has a
disagreement over whose turn it is to have spring break.
The Ad Hoc Parentage Committee” (the “Committee”) of the
Florida Bar’s Family Law Section continues the search for
solutions for “quasi- marital children” that are centered upon the
best interests of those children in a fast-developing area of the law.
The Florida Family Law Section and its Committee, working with
legislators, suggest that laws are needed to deal specifically with
these “quasi- marital” families and that this legislation should go
farther to take into account the multitude of family groups in the
real world. Best interests of children may not, in the end, have as
much to do with the niceties of “legitimacy” and “intact families”,
as having children benefit from having everyone who cares for
them inside the legal family compound. Legislation has been
introduced, so far without success, that would give Courts more
real-world pragmatic approaches to situations wherein a child may
106
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benefit from having more than two parents. Guidelines for
allocating child timesharing and financial responsibility in that
event are set out in the proposed legislation. As would seem to be
harkened by trends in the Courts, culminating in Simmonds, the
proposed legislation gives more latitude to Courts to fashion more
creative and complex arrangements, when it is in the child’s best
interests.107 This would be in addition to revamped and “gender
neutral” statutory revisions throughout.
Other thoughtful conversations about solutions to these issues
have also been taking place. In 2017, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a group of lawyers and
judges that proposes model laws, drafted its newest proposed
paternity statute, (Uniform Parentage Act) that would also deal
with these quasi- marital children and their family litigation. Its
comments specifically state as a goal dealing in cases wherein
there are more than one presumption (eg. there is a husband but
another man is listed on the birth certificate). This code also allows
for legal rights to be provided to third parties who have
“functioned as the child’s parent for a significant period”. It calls
for determining the victor in parentage contests between multiple
parents by way of using best interests’ factors that are very similar
to Florida Statute §61.16. Interestingly, this proposed code
provides two alternates for adoption by states, one that would limit
the number of legal parents to two, and one that would allow for
the option of more than two being named if to do otherwise would
be detrimental to the child.108 Various states have adopted laws
that allow for both “psychological parents” to win custody as well
as provide for more than two parents.109 Certainly, same-sex coparents are increasingly the norm in many jurisdictions, including
Florida.110
The New York Times Magazine has reported that childwelfare advocates opine that best interests of children should
dominate in contests between biological father and legal fathers. In
addition to the biological connection, the recognition that
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parenthood is not necessarily bound to genetics must be
remembered. Reproductive technology has opened up both the
possible parenting combinations, and also the ways of thinking
about what it means to be a parent. It is now possible for one
woman to carry the egg of another woman, only to have that
woman be surrogate to two altogether different parents.111
Courts across the country struggle with these issues, and are
in need of legislation that keeps up with the realities of paternity
contests of all kinds. In the case In re Paternity of Cheryl112 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court urged the state to require
that putative fathers submit to genetic testing before signing a
paternity-acknowledgment form or child-support agreement,
arguing that “to do otherwise places at risk the well-being of
children.”113 This may not solve the problem of the presumption
related to marriage, but it would help in scores of other problems,
including disestablishments brought by fathers long after children
are old enough to be aware they are losing a father. This would
also assist in those too frequent cases wherein there is a legal
father/husband, but there is a potentially biological father at the
hospital ready to sign the birth certificate.
X. CONCLUSION
As is known intimately to anyone who has ever spent a
morning in a family court hearing room, custody contests are some
of the most heartbreaking, dysfunctional and emotional scenes of
American life. Well-meaning legal professionals work to assist
angry, hurt and embattled families through a labyrinth of
substantive laws, procedural rules, confusing local standing orders,
and judicial requirements (capricious and not). The outcome is that
the public is often shocked and horrified about what does or does
not make it into a courtroom, and confused about why everyone
else’s values and assumptions are different from their own.
The areas of law discussed herein are common enough to
come up in just about every family practitioner’s career, and yet
not common enough for most practitioners to be conversant about
111
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the important legal history and cases that offer the most insight. It
is likely many judges are also not as conversant as they could be,
and may have a tendency to want to continue the old trend of using
“standing” as the easy way out of these cases. The author hope that
this article will assist everyone involved, at least on the legal end,
to be more thoughtful and intentional in dealing with these kinds of
cases, and consider, above all, the needs and best interests of the
innocent children at the heart of it all.

